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Post-Sale Restraints via Patent
Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Perspective
Peter Carstensen∗
The use of post-sale restraints on buyers of patented goods is
an increasingly common strategy of patent holders. The seller
attaches a notice to the patented good or a good containing a
patented component purporting to limit scope of what the buyer
has bought and imposing explicit restraints on buyers’ freedom to
resell the product or take other actions. The patent community has
sought to justify and explain these post-sale restraints based on an
analogy to the right of real property owners to encumber such
property with covenants that restrict future owners. The key claim
is that the patent owner has the right to divide the interests in the
goods being sold and declare that only some rights were
transferred. This conception provides a basis to bind not only the
party in privity but all others who come, or might come, into
possession of this property. Interestingly, it appears that only those
with notice of the restraint can be bound. This suggests once again
the contractual origins of this claim.

∗ Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. This paper grows out of the
very useful discussion of patent licensing held at Fordham Law School’s annual
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal symposium in November
2005. John Richards et al., Panel I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The Scope of Downstream
Licensing Restrictions, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1025 (2006). In
addition, I have drawn on comments made in two related presentations—one at New
York University Law School and one to the Antitrust Law and Economics Seminar at the
University of Wisconsin Law School. Because many of the attendees at these various
presentations expressed strong reservations about the ideas presented, I found those
opportunities very helpful in testing and clarifying my analysis. As an expert for the
defendants, I was involved in two of the cases referenced or discussed in this article:
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018
(N.D. Iowa, 2003), and Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Miss.
2004). The analysis presented, however, relies entirely on publicly available materials
including the public filings in those cases.
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This expanded right to restraint use and resale destroys the
vitality of the first sale doctrine in patent law, which was first
announced in 1873. 1 That doctrine held that the rights of the
patent holder expired at the point when the patented good was sold.
But the first sale doctrine only applied to a property right
conception and never spoke to the right to enter into contractual
restraints linked to the sale of patented property. Indeed, such
restraints are in fact commonplace in a variety of sales not
involving patents. In this alternative conception, the buyer by
buying is said to agree to those limits. Indeed, such agreements are
now often inferred if the purchaser has actual or constructive
notice of the limits. 2 If the buyer breaches that contract including
making sales or transfers that it had agreed not to make, the seller
has a variety of contract remedies that it can invoke against both
the seller and any buyer who induced a breach of the contract.
A careful reading of the Federal Circuit’s opinion that created
the modern foundation for the expansion of post-sale restraints
shows that it derived the right to engage in such restraints from the
contractual model and not from any inherent patent right. 3 Indeed,
the legal conceptual label is less relevant than the functional point,
drawn from contract, that the seller must have a legitimate
justification for the restraint. Yet district courts, and the Federal
Circuit itself, have lost sight of that crucial analytic point and its
significance for the validity of such restraints. 4 The expansive
conception of this right to restrain buyers has lead courts to
insulate unjustified exclusionary and exploitative conduct by
sellers who happen to have patent rights from critical review on the
merits except in a extreme circumstances. 5
Broadly stated, the thesis of this Comment is all post-sale
restraints are “contractual” in nature and therefore subject to
1

See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
3
See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
4
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir 2004); Pioneer HiBred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Iowa, 2003);
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (currently on appeal to
the Federal Circuit).
5
See Monsanto Co. v. Baumgardner, No. 04-708 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2005)
(unreported opinion, on file with the author).
2
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review under both contract law and antitrust law. Both legal
regimes condemn unnecessary restraints on the freedom of the
buyer. But both also recognize that a wide variety of post-sale
restraints can be lawful. In general, legality turns on whether there
is some legitimate venture between the parties or some feature of
the transaction that warrants the limit on post-sale competition.
This “ancillary restraint” analysis applies to both contract and
antitrust law.
When a patented product is sold, there is a further question of
whether in some limited circumstance the interest of the patent
holder in exploiting its rights could justify an otherwise unlawful
restraint. Given the long standing first sale doctrine, it is plausible
that absent an express legislative authorization, no such right
exists. But if such a right were inferred from the overall phrasing
of the patent code, the patent holder should not have unlimited
discretion to select among the restraints it might employ. Instead,
given the general reliance on the open market, any post-sale
restraint intended to exploit a legitimate patent interest should be
the least intrusive, reasonably fitted to protecting the narrowly
defined patent interest of the owner. Moreover, the courts in
inferring any right to impose post-sale restraints that only function
to exploit patent rights need to delineate the scope of such rights
with particular attention to the underlying goals of patent law.
Those goals are to promote innovation in the “useful arts” with the
minimum exploitation of the public needed to call forth innovation
and with no more disruption of the overall economy than is
necessary to achieve that goal.
The use of patent rights by owners of patents on seeds or traits
within seeds provides an illuminating set of contexts within which
to examine these issues. Over the last two decades the seed
industry has developed a great number of patented genetic
modifications to key crops. In the case of hybrid seeds, the
resulting plants will not produce seeds that are “true” to type. So,
the patent holder faces no risk of “misappropriation” of its patented
genetics. On the other hand, other seeds are the result of
inbreeding and the resulting plants produce seeds that are true
copies of the original. The buyer of such seeds can reproduce
copies at will and absent some constraint can either re-plant or sell
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the seeds. This comment is “seedcentric” in its focus because there
are several examples of the use of post-sale restraints on seeds that
illustrate the range of goals that such requirements can serve. The
issues and analysis presented here have, however, much broader
application. They go to the heart of the authorization of patent
holders to impose post-sale restraints on the operation of the
competitive market. The ultimate hypothetical would ask whether
a notice posted on a new car can restrain the buyer from reselling
the car except with the manufacturer’s consent. 6
The Discussion starts, in Part I, with a proposed framework for
understanding the post-sale rights of sellers of goods. This
framework rests on the key premise that naked restraints on
alienation are, like all other naked restraints, inefficient and
economically undesirable in general. The framework rests on the
lengthy experience of open markets that inherent rights (property
type claims) are unnecessary to providing a legal basis to protect
most legitimate post-sale interests of the seller. The addition of
patent rights does not change this calculus except in a very limited
situation. The policy questions that courts ought to ask in that
context are 1) whether they can re-write the patent laws to expand
their coverage, and 2) if so, how expansive a right ought to be
granted. Part II applies this framework, first, to the case that
reasserted the right to post-sale restraints for patented goods and
then to three cases involving seed company use of expansive, postsale restraints on the buyer’s freedom of action. Part III concludes
the analysis by re-examining the problem of post-sale restraints in
the context of patented goods.
I. A CONTRACTUAL-INHERENT RIGHT MODEL OF PATENT RIGHTS
In ordinary commerce, when a good is sold the buyer takes full
and complete possession, dominion, and control of the good. This
includes the right to resell it and to use it in any way that the buyer
sees fit. There is a powerful economic logic behind such a policy.
If the seller can limit the rights transferred, this creates a serious
6

Books published prior to the imposition of the first sale doctrine in copyright actually
had on the cover page such a restraint. It was clearly intended to weaken or destroy the
market in used books.

CARSTENSEN_091706_CLEAN

2006]

9/17/2006 5:49:30 PM

POST SALE PATENT RESTRAINTS

1057

inhibition on the market. Subsequent buyers require notice of
these limits and a registry would be needed to let third parties
ascertain what rights they can or might acquire from such a seller. 7
The original buyer must also refer to the limits in the purchase
document to determine what use it can or may make of the good
that it has purchased. In contrast, warranties, and other similar
post-sale obligations are the result of contracts that focus on
specific commitments by the seller to the buyer. The market for
goods would be seriously undermined and transaction costs driven
up greatly if sellers were allowed to limit the rights sold as a matter
of right. 8
Of course, there are a number of situations in which the owner
of goods will lease or rent those goods to others. The prototypical
situation gives the owner substantial obligations for the property
and right to its return in good working order. As the “lease”
becomes a device that manipulates title and other formal indicia,
but confers on the possessor the effective full right of use, a
functional analysis would label that a sale even if the tax or
corporate accounting laws might give it a different name. It
should, nevertheless, be acknowledged that there are likely to be
some boundary problems between the renting or leasing of
property and its sale. In general that distinction makes no
difference because in either case any restraint on the user/buyer’s
use of that property is a matter of contract and so subject to both
the limits of contract law itself as well as those of antitrust law. In
fact, the Clayton Act’s section 3 expressly addresses such restraints
7
In the case of real property, title recording, a costly and complex process, provides
the basis on which buyers or third parties, e.g., lenders, can ascertain the nature of the
interests of the nominal “owner.” While there are procedures for recording liens and
judgments, the burden and expense of expanding this recording process to encompass a
comprehensive system of fractured interests in goods would be overwhelming.
8
This was the core rational for the Supreme Court decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) that is popularly thought to have
condemned all resale price maintenance. In fact, the Court rejected Dr. Miles’ claim of
an inherent right to control the resale of his patented medicines but acknowledged that
such restraints would be lawful if in furtherance of a legitimate objective. Id. at 400–06.
But the pleadings showed that Dr. Miles only sought to create and enforce a retailer’s
cartel. Id. at 407. See Peter Carstensen, The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution
Restraints: The Efficiency Hypothesis Versus the Rent Seeking Alternatives, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (2001).
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and condemns them whenever they may “substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.” 9
Thus, when the owner of a good, whether patented or
unpatented, parts with the possession and control over that good,
its right to restrain the new possessor stems from contract law and
not from some inherent right. 10 This suggests that when a patent
holder sells a good, it too should be constrained with respect to
post-sale rights to those it establishes via a lawful contract with the
buyer. Thus, the post-sale restraint involving a patented good
should, in general, be treated like any other contract. It does not
implicate the patent or patent right. Its validity is contingent on
there being a valid basis for the contract itself. This also implies
that the contract defines who is bound by such a restraint.
The doctrine of exhaustion of patent rights (the first sale
But its
doctrine) has existed for more than 130 years. 11
dimensions remain unclear. 12 The basic problem is that in a few
limited post-sale contexts, an unrestrained buyer may invade the
inherent rights of the patent owner in ways that only a restraint on
buyer conduct can control.13 Such a restraint only serves to
increase the patent owner’s reward beyond that which it could
derive from the sale directly. In many other situations, the patent
owner and the buyer have a legitimate joint interest in some aspect
of the transaction that warrants some further contractual restraint.
Current law has muddled these two concepts with the result that
the inherent right claim has come to dominant the contractual right
theory when patents are involved. This is understandable given the

9

15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000).
See Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 405; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
11
See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
12
See, e.g., B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419, 1426–28
(Fed. Cir. 1997); PSC, Inc. v. Symbol Technologies, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 505 (W.D.N.Y.
1998); cf., Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860, 869–71 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
13
Cf., Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (patent
covered process applying generally available chemical for which there was no other
commercial use; patent holder given the right to bar others from sale of chemical as
contributing to infringement by the buyer).
10
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greater rights that a patent owner has whenever the dispute can be
cast as one involving invasion of inherent rights.
Post-sale contracts involve a large number of transactions.
Warranty and other service commitments are obvious examples.
But the business considerations can be much more complex. The
producer and buyer of the good may want to enter into a joint
venture to distribute the good in particular areas or to particular
classes of consumers. In such a transaction, both the buyer and
seller face risks of opportunism from the other party. Hence,
mutual restraints may be appropriate. The seller may have
concerns about free-riding and the failure of the buyer to incur the
costs necessary to develop and serve the target market while the
buyer may be concerned that it will be unable to recover its costs
in developing that market if the seller is free to sell to others who
might make entry after the market is developed. Patent law is
particularly sensitive to these interests recognizing both territorial
and field of use licenses. Such agreements make economic sense
whenever the licensee is incurring risks and making investments to
develop the market for the patented good.
In contrast, in a few instances the only interest of the patent
holder is to exclude post-sale activity that arguably involves the
buyer’s own use of the patent but which also involves the
replication of the patented good. This also can occur in the context
of copyrighted goods. 14 In such cases, on the one hand the rights
owner has in fact sold the good but at the same time faces the
problem of replication in ways that increase the value of the good
to the possessor. It would be an obvious case of infringement if
the possessor sells the duplicated good to others. That deprives the
patent owner of a sale or royalty on a sale. The harder case occurs
only when the buyer replicates the product for its own use. Here
the question is whether the buyer has not inherently acquired that
right when it buys the good. As the Supreme Court observed: “the
patentee . . . receives the consideration for its use and he parts with
the right to restrict that use.” 15
14

Computer software is easily copied and so a buyer can replicate its initial purchase
for its own use. Arguably, a copyright based right to restrict such copying for one’s own
use acts to protect the right to sell multiple copies.
15
Adams, 84 U.S. at 456.
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In looking at this problem, it is important to have criteria for
judging the scope of any right being asserted. Professor Jim Chen
has recently suggested that the touchstone for interpreting the
scope of rights conferred by specific statutes involving innovation
and the creative arts is the underlying constitutional provision. 16 It
establishes the goal of patent law as “Progress of Science and the
useful Arts.” 17 In application, this goal would suggest that only
narrowly focused rights should exist in the post-sale world with
respect to the use made by a buyer. Indeed, absent congressional
authorization one might argue that no such rights should exist. It is
Congress and not the courts that should define the rights that it
wishes to grant in order to stimulate innovation. Thus, like any
other grant to exploit the public, the patent laws should be
narrowly construed. 18
In sum, the general framework is that post-sale, a patent holder
should have all the rights to enter into contracts with the buyer that
any other seller has. Contract law defines the scope and limits of
such rights with antitrust law providing a further outer boundary
where there is a creditable threat to the competitive process. Patent
rights as such have no bearing on this framework. Only in the very
limited case where the buyer has obtained some apparent ability to
replicate the invention for its own internal use should the law even
consider whether the patent owner’s interest in naked exploitation
should provide a basis to restrict the buyer’s freedom. Assuming
the courts have the authority, sua sponte, to create such a right, the
question is what limit should exist on the privilege of restraining
the buyer’s freedom? The right being protected provides a
measure of the appropriate restraint—it should be no more
restrictive than necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the
16

Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in
Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105 (2005).
17
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. Although I have heard the suggestion that this provision
was in fact reconsidered and rejected at the constitutional convention and only remained
in the published draft as a result of a printer’s error, there is, so far as I can tell, no basis
for such a claim.
18
“Intellectual property” is a label that conceals a central “public choice” problem.
The only rights that exist are those given by law. Such rights are therefore a target for
special interest groups seeking to maximize their wealth. For this reason alone, courts
should construe all such legislatively created rights strictly to minimize the adverse effect
of such “rent seeking” behavior.
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patent holder in its patent rights. This in turn does require the
courts to be more explicit about the scope of the right to exploit
buyers that patent holders should have.
II. THE CASES
This part focuses on the foundation case that subsequent courts
regard as reestablishing the right of patent holders to impose post
sale restraints as an inherent part of the sale of patented goods, and
three seed related cases that reflect a range of circumstances in
which patentees sought to apply the doctrine. In each instance, the
focus of the analysis is on the merits of the restraints in terms of
the public interests in open markets and the protection of the
legitimate interests of patent owners.
A. The Foundation Decision—Mallinckrodt
The modern foundation case said to recognize the expanded
rights of patent holders to use license restrictions in the post-sale
context is Mallinckrodt v. Medipart. 19 The patent holder claimed
that although it “sold” the product, buyers had to agree to dispose
of it or return it to the patent holder after a single use. The alleged
infringer had obtained these products from the buyers and refilled
them so that they could be reused.
The core of the Mallinckrodt court’s justification for the
restriction on reuse was that there were public safety and product
liability reasons for it. Specifically the product involved the use of
radioactive materials, and the claim was that the reuse might result
in serious harms if the specific device was not properly recharged
as well as potential product liability for the patent holdermanufacturer. The patent holder asserted that the defendant had
induced patent infringement by the buyers. 20 Moreover, it
characterized its contractual restriction as a “field of use”
restriction authorized by patent law. 21

19
20
21

976 F. 2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 703.
Id.
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The Federal Circuit upheld the restriction relying on a mixture
of old patent decisions and the Supreme Court’s Sylvania decision
that had expanded the right of manufacturers to restrict distribution
of their products. 22 The central rational was that: “Patent holders
should not be in a worse position, by virtue of the patent right to
exclude, than owners of other property used in trade.” 23 The
opinion also cited to Tripoli v. Wella, 24 a case the Supreme Court
had cited with approval in Sylvania. Tripoli had upheld a resale
restraint on a hair product intended for professional use only
because of its potential risks in the hands of ordinary consumers. 25
The rationale for that decision had been that the contractual
restraint allowed the manufacturer to sell the product at a reduced
price because of the reduction in the risk of product liability
claims. 26 Thus, the Federal Circuit’s rationale in Mallinckrodt is
identical to that which the producer of an unpatented product could
assert with respect to a cost saving restraint on opportunistic resale
of the product. The central issue in such a case is whether the
claim is factually valid or simply a pretextual claim. 27
An alternative hypothesis for Mallinckrodt’s restraint is that it
sought to increase revenue by eliminating the potential for reuse by
the buyer. 28 This explanation would mean that the patent holder
has claimed the right to compel buyers to buy new goods each time
they needed to have the product even though these buyers already
had purchased products that were in fact reusable. If ordinary
contract law applied, and if Mallinckrodt had market power in the
22

Id. at 705–07 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvannia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977)).
23
Id. at 708.
24
Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980);
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See also Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297 n.7
(1985) (group refusal to deal based on membership rules of a legitimate joint venture is
not per se illegal absent a showing that the refusal was pretextual).
28
There is a technical issue here as to whether the reuse constituted “repair” of the
product or reconstruction. Patent law permits the buyer to repair but not to reconstruct.
The opinion evades this issue by reference to the limited license and asserts that the
limitation necessarily deprives the buyer of the right to repair the product. See
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d. 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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market for these devices, then at least arguably its use of this
contract term would be an unlawful exploitation of its dominance
of that market. 29 Indeed, the contract term itself, if only to serve
this purpose, might be invalid under basic contract law. It
interferes with the rights of a buyer after the seller has parted with
title, dominion and control over the product. Moreover, it would
clearly conflict with the command of Burke v. Adams.
The Federal Circuit did not decide that Mallinckrodt’s
legitimate justification was factually valid. It only rejected the trial
court’s “per se” condemnation of the restraint based on the first
sale doctrine. It remanded the case for further proceedings at
which, presumably, the issue would be whether the evidence
supported Mallinckrodt’s claimed justification. 30
Thus, the
foundation case despite its invocation of patent law and rights
appears to rest on a conventional contract analysis that would
apply regardless of the existence of patent and which would be
subject to antitrust law to the extent that the restraint was
unreasonable.
Unfortunately, no further proceedings were
reported.
In sum, the Mallinckrodt decision rested on the recognition that
a patent holder has the same rights to contract with buyers that any
other seller has. The only patent aspect of the case was that
Mallinckrodt has the right to claim that inducing breach of the
contract is contributory infringement. This does not change the
underlying character of the case: Mallinckrodt was contending it
had a valid contract restricting its customers from reusing the
equipment; the defendant’s position was that the agreement was
29

Such a restraint is similar to tying in that the buyer is required to take something
additional—a new product each time there is the need to reuse the product. It reflects the
use of market power in the product line to compel the buyer to accept a higher effective
price for the good than would exist is a workably competitive market. Thus, such a
practice involves the prima facie use of market power and distorts the choices of buyers
as well as limiting the market for services associated with the reuse of the patented good.
Thus, such a restraint interferes with the competition on the merits. Absent a nonexploitative justification for such a restraint, it should be condemned as a naked restraint
on competition.
30
84 U.S. 453 (1873). One of the many anomalies of antitrust law is the courts rarely
concern themselves with details such as identifying the party with the burden of pleading
or offering evidence on an issue even though it should be obvious that the assignment of
such obligations might facilitate the conduct of cases.
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invalid. If in fact the explanation for the agreement was that it
impaired the rights of the buyer to make use of the goods
purchased for the economic benefit of the seller, then such a
restraint in a contract of sale would be invalid as an unreasonable
restraint on alienation. On the other hand, if Mallinckrodt’s
explanation that the reason for the restraint was both to protect
public health and reduce the cost of the product because the
limitation avoided very substantial insurance/risk expenses was
established, then the restraint would be valid regardless of the
presence or absence of a patent. On remand, the focus of the
litigation would be on the merits of the justification for the
restraint. This would properly limit the authorization for post-sale
restraints to situations where any seller could lawfully impose a
restraint.
B. Baumgardner—Choice of Forum as an Element of the Patent
License
Monsanto owns patents to genetic characteristics that make
plants resistant to glyphosate, a powerful, broad spectrum
herbicide. If a farmer plants such seeds, she can then spray
glyphosate over the top of the crop, eliminate weeds, and avoid
more costly methods of protecting the crop from weeds. Monsanto
follows a number of substantive practices that seek to exploit the
economic value of this trait. It licenses a number of seed
companies to include the trait in their seeds, but requires that each
ultimate buyer of seed must agree to a “technology license” and
pay a license fee. For many years, Monsanto insisted that the fee
be separately billed to the farmers, but eventually allowed the seed
companies to combine the fee into the overall price of the product.
The technology license imposes important restraints on the buyer.
The most notable is that the farmer can not save and replant the
seeds derived from the farmer’s own crop. The merits of this
restraint are the subject of various law suits and will be discussed
subsequently in connection with the McFarling decision.
Among other elements of this license is a forum selection
clause. The forum selected is that of the Federal District Court in
St. Louis, Missouri where Monsanto’s headquarters are located.
The clause both authorizes Monsanto to bring any proceeding for
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breach of the license in that forum and requires the licensee to use
that forum if it wants to contest any aspect of the license. Such
forum selection clauses are frequent features of contracts whether
or not the contract involves a patented product or some other
goods. Different jurisdictions give greater or lesser deference to
such clauses.
A group of farmers who had purchased seeds with the
Monsanto traits and who had therefore signed the technology
license commenced class action law suits against Monsanto in
various state courts. The cases charged a variety of violations of
state antitrust law. Monsanto then filed its own lawsuit in the
federal court in St. Louis contending that the farmer plaintiffs had
violated the technology license by violating the forum selection
clause. It followed, Monsanto contended, that the licenses
allowing the farmers to plant crops with Monsanto traits were void
and so the farmers were infringing Monsanto’s patent. Monsanto
demanded that the court enjoin the farmers from continuing to
raise those crops and award it damages for their infringement. 31
In a carefully reasoned opinion the District Court rejected
Monsanto’s claim that a forum selection clause was part of a patent
license. 32 The opinion recognized that forum selection could be an
appropriate element of a contract of sale at least under the laws of
some jurisdictions, but it refused to allow Monsanto to convert the
right to make such a contract into a right to treat its breach as a
voiding of the underlying transaction by which the patented
genetic trait was sold to the farmer. In addition, applying the law
of Missouri, the court held that if the contract term involved a
penalty of forfeiture of the right to use the patented goods, that
would be unconscionable. This left Monsanto with its basic
contract claim to have the various cases transferred to the federal
court in Missouri to the extent that the law of the forum states
would recognize and enforce such a right. 33

31

Monsanto Co. v. Baumgardner, No. 4:04-CV00708-ERW (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29 2005).
Id. Curiously, the opinion, a copy on file with the author, is no longer available on
the district court web site nor is it reported in the WestLaw case index.
33
Ultimately, the plaintiffs decided to consolidate their cases against Monsanto in the
federal court in St. Louis. They have filed amended complaints that charge both state and
32

CARSTENSEN_091706_CLEAN

1066

9/17/2006 5:49:30 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1053

This decision is a good illustration of the application of the
contract principle in the context of post-sale restraints. Here the
restraint was on the forum in which any dispute would be resolved.
There are plausible arguments for adoption of such restraints as an
incident to a sale although there are also some powerful counter
arguments. The central point is that such a provision has nothing
to do with any unique aspect of the patent on the underlying
product. Rather, the issue is whether the contractual restraint is a
lawful one under the law of the state in which the sale was made.
C. Ottawa—Contractual Price Discrimination
In Pioneer Hybrid Seed v. Ottawa 34 a major corn seed producer
obtained patents on some of the genetic material in its hybrid seeds
and placed a notice on the bags that restricted the buyer’s use to
planting the seed or using it for animal feed. The intended
implication of this restriction was that a buyer could not resell the
seed. Ottawa was in the business of supplying its customers with a
variety of seed and agricultural chemicals. It would, among other
things, seek out farmers or dealers who had excess Pioneer seed or
who would be willing to buy such seed from Pioneer at Pioneer’s
price and then resell it to Ottawa for re-sale to other farmers.
Because hybrid seed can not reproduce itself, there was no danger
of Ottawa using the seed to create duplicates, it was only in the
business of buying and reselling a commodity that happened to
contain components that were patented.
Such transactions are plausible economically under two
possible business contexts. First, if Pioneer had misallocated its
seed inventories resulting in inadequate supply in a region and was
unable to shift seed inventories efficiently, then an independent
reseller would be able to engage in arbitrage—buying in one
market and reselling in another. Indeed, it may well be difficult
and costly for a large organization such as Pioneer to identify
where unmet demand existed and then move modest quantities of
seed from one location to another. Its dealers would have to report

federal antitrust law violations. Schoenbaum v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:05CV-01108-ERW (E.D. Mo. 2005).
34
283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N. D. Iowa 2003).
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that they had excess demand for specific types of seed for Pioneer
to locate such seed in the hands of other dealers and work out the
logistics of transfer including both the physical and financial
details. Hence, an independent business that started with orders
from farmers seeking particular seeds could be more efficient in
locating and reselling such seed.
Second, if Pioneer gave volume buyers substantial discounts,
there would be an incentive for such a buyer to buy the minimum
necessary to get the lowest price if it could resell its surplus to a
buyer that could in turn resell it to other farmers. The second set
of farmers would have been low volume direct buyers who would
otherwise have paid a higher price for seed. The independent seed
merchant must, of course, take the risk of buying and reselling.
For this kind of arbitrage to be economically viable, Pioneer must
offer reasonably substantial volume discounts. Such discounts
would have to exceed the cost savings arising from volume sales
because the independent re-seller will have to incur the expenses of
moving relatively small lots of seed to various buyers. Only if the
price differential between large and low volume sales were
substantial would it pay a third party to incur the costs and risks
associated with such transactions.
There are several reasons why, absent arbitrage among high
and low volume buyers, a seller would favor large buyers with
high discounts. Such buyers are likely to be more sophisticated
and so less likely to buy seed based solely on brand name or
company reputation. Instead, they are likely to identify the
alternative seeds that would best serve their interests and then seek
to get as competitive a price as possible. Major buyers are also
opinion leaders in their communities. Hence, ensuring that such
buyers are using a company’s product is likely to induce other,
lower volume buyers to follow suit. These considerations suggest
that it is unlikely that the producer will eliminate discounts for
volume buyers. Instead, facing successful arbitrage it will be
compelled to reduce the price of smaller quantities of seed until the
difference is such that it ceases to be attractive for independent
resellers to engage in arbitrage based on price differences.
Both types of arbitrage improve market efficiency. In the case
of transfer of seed to meet actual demand, the independent dealer
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can only do this profitably if it is more efficient than Pioneer.
Hence, this lowers the social cost of getting the goods to the
customers who desire them. Meanwhile, Pioneer has collected the
full royalty it sought and has avoided all other transaction costs. In
the case of arbitrage between high and low volume buyers, there is
also an efficiency gain from society’s perspective. Seed is moving
to those who desire it at a lower price which will result in a larger
volume of sales as low volume buyers are able to plant more of the
more desirable crop. Pioneer has not limited the volume it will sell
to any particular buyer and so in effect has recognized that it is
willing to make large volume sales at that price. What it seeks to
do is to extract extra income from the low volume buyer with
relatively inelastic demand.
This is a purely exploitative
maneuver.
Basically, Pioneer asserted that it had the inherent right under
patent law to restrict the buyer’s use of the seed. It made no claim
that these restrictions avoided risks of product liability or
consumer harm. Furthermore, given the nature of hybrid seed it
had no basis to claim that buyers who did not plant would be able
to reproduce its patented goods and sell them to third parties.
Pioneer did assert that the arbitrage of seed disrupted its
distribution system and interfered with its differential pricing
scheme. But it did not claim that there was some particular
efficiency or economic justification to its system that required the
limitation on resale. 35 Essentially, it was asserting that it had the
right to exploit its low volume customers by use of the re-sale
restraint. Moreover, it implicitly took the position that the
inefficiency in its distribution system that produced misallocation
of seed was a necessary element to its price discrimination scheme.
Based on its expansive reading of Mallinckrodt, 36 the District
Court granted summary judgment to Pioneer holding that Ottawa
had infringed the patent restriction by both buying and then
reselling the seed. This holding rested expressly on the assertion
35

Many scholars see the facts of Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977), and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717
(1988), as illustrating legitimate resale restraints based on risk of free-riding by retailers
on the seller efforts of competitors.
36
283 F. Supp. 2d at 1031–35.
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that the patent holder could “sell” only a limited interest in a good
having patented components. Thus, the notice on the bag disclosed
to the buyer that the buyer obtained only the rights conferred by
the notice and no others. 37 But the same result would follow if a
seller can by contract restrict the resale of its goods.
The most plausible business explanation for Pioneer’s
restrictions was to facilitate price discrimination among buyers of
its seeds. While price variance to the final customer is not illegal
in itself, 38 when the enterprise seeking to discriminate must get
agreement from its customers not to resell the product, there is an
obvious contract in restraint of trade. As a matter of contract law,
it is at least questionable whether the seller of a good can impose a
resale restraint when the only justification is that the seller wants to
charge others a higher price.
As a matter of antitrust law, the initial question is whether there
is a legitimate business justification for such a price discriminatory
scheme. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court has hinted that its
historic opposition to price discrimination may be weakening. 39
Certainly, imposing higher prices on small buyers than would
occur in an open market without any claim of special services or
other gains to the buyer would seem to go beyond the outer limits
37

At the same time, the district court held that there should be a trial on damages and
pointed out that the defendant’s experts had suggested that the patent owner had not lost
any patent royalty because all its sales had been voluntary ones for which it had received
the price it requested. Hence, the defendant argued there was no basis to find that the
patent owner had suffered any loss of its patent revenue entitlement. See id. at 1052–54.
38
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000), this discrimination
would be unlawful if the price differences were imposed on distributors in competition
with each other. Because the disfavored farmers are seen as final buyers, even though
they sell their corn crop in competition with the favored buyers, they have no basis to
complain about the fact that they paid a higher price for seed than was cost justified.
39
See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292 (2006) (“it is
generally recognized that [price discrimination] also occurs in fully competitive
markets . . . .”). Previously, the Court had indicated that price discrimination was
inherently objectionable. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610
(1977). In context, the Court may only have meant that price discrimination does not of
itself prove market power, a necessary element in unlawful tying. Moreover, Richard
Posner, a leader of the Chicago School of antitrust law and economics has recently
declared that price discrimination is in fact very problematic in terms of its economic
impact. Richard Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229,
235–37 (2005).
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of such toleration. Thus, given the lack of any non-exploitative
explanation for the price differential, it seems more like that this
restraint on the buyer’s freedom to use or resell the seed would be
classified as a naked limit on competition and so per se unlawful.
Pioneer’s price discrimination facilitating restraints were
lawful, therefore, only because its patents conferred a right that the
law otherwise condemns. Moreover, the grant of right to Pioneer
allowed it to extract from its low volume customers higher prices
than would have been possible in an unrestrained market for such
goods. It achieves this result not based on the value of its patented
product because it was willing to sell that product in volume at
lower prices or leave it in inventory in areas where demand was
too low. The central question here is whether the interest in
promoting innovation justifies this kind of inefficient, exploitation
of sub-sets of buyers.
D. McFarling—No Replanting of Patented Seed
Monsanto licensed various seed companies to use its patented
genetic material that made soybeans, corn and cotton resistant to
glyphosate herbicide. This initial license required that the licensee
in turn impose a “technology agreement” on the farmers buying the
seed that included a ban on replanting the seeds gathered from the
crop. Moreover, at the time of the McFarling case, farmers paid a
separate “technology” fee to Monsanto along with the price of the
seed itself. This created a direct contractual relationship between
the ultimate buyer and Monsanto giving Monsanto formal privity
of contract with the farmer buyers. Thus, Monsanto purported to
reach through the licencee to the user of its technology that created
herbicide resistant crops to command that the farmers be given
only the right to plant a single crop with the seed. Hence, farmers
were compelled to buy new seed each year if they wanted the
benefit of the resistance to herbicide.
Monsanto spent a great deal of money enforcing this restraint.
The patent right based argument for the replant limit is that both
cotton and soybeans produce seeds that exactly reproduce the
plant. Therefore, allowing a farmer to save and replant such seeds
would give the benefit of the patented characteristic without
paying for that right. The counter argument is that the farmer
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bought the seed and that includes the capacity of the seed to
reproduce itself. If a farmer sold such seed, the case of patent
infringement would seem convincing because in that case the seller
was directly depriving the patent holder of the right to claim a
license fee.
Thus, Monsanto had two concerns. First, the farmer might
replant the seed, and second, the farmer might sell the seed.
However, its no-replant restriction does more than require payment
for saved seed used or sold for replanting. It prohibits replanting
altogether and thereby requires the farmer to buy new seed for his
own land and not compete with seed companies in the sale of seed
that is a good substitute for the seed companies’ own seed. Hence,
the focus of protection is on the seed producer and not the
collection of royalties whenever the patented trait is either used
(replanting) or sold. The question is what rights should Monsanto
retain with respect to the post-sale use by the buyer of the seeds
purchased?
The comparative economics of the situation are roughly these.
New seed prices based on the higher value put on certified seed
(guaranteed quality from a seed company) might be $17 a bag plus
a patent license fee charged by the patent owner ($8) for a total
cost of, hypothetically, $25 a bag for certified soybean seed. If a
farmer saves seed, the opportunity cost is the price of such seed
sold for processing, say $6 a bag. In addition, the farmer has to
have the seed cleaned and tested by a seed cleaner in order to be
assured that the seed will be readily usable for plantingBthis might
add another $2 to the cost. 40 If the farmer also pays the patent
owner the license fee for each bag used in re-planting, the total
costs would be, on these hypothetical figures, about $16 a bag or a
saving of about $9 per bag. Thus, the specific form of the license
involved in this situation increases the buyer’s costs by 36% over
the hypothetical alternative. Moreover, the patent holder gets no
more from its more costly system than from the less costly one.

40
In the case of cotton, it appears that cleaning is an absolute necessity for use while in
the case of soybeans it is highly recommended and usual.
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The beneficiaries are the seed company licensees who do not have
to compete with saved seed. 41
If the farmer sells the seed, presumably the price will be less
than certified seed since the farmer selling “brown bag” seed can
not provide the same level of assurance of quality. The central
point is that saved seed provides a cap on the pricing freedom of
sellers of certified (new) seed. That cap relates to the price of the
seed as seed. As such it is independent of the price of the trait
components for which a separate price can or might be charged. If
the goal of the patent law were to protect the interest of patent
owners and if the law were to take an expansive view of that right,
i.e., that the patent owner is entitled to claim separate
compensation for each reuse of its genetic trait by the buyer, then
the right of the patent holder would extend no further than
claiming compensation for seed saved and either replanted or sold.
After all, the patent holder had already made the prior decision to
sell the patented trait embedded in a seed that would reproduce.
Hence, the patent holder has already waived any right to absolutely
refuse others the right to use or benefit from the invention. The
central issue is the scope of discretion given to the patent holder in
seeking to collect from buyers who either reuse or sell the results
of the use of the patented good.
Despite the obvious exploitation of buyers by this form of
license, the Federal Circuit found no objection to it. 42 In the case,
it appeared that the farmer had not sold any of the saved seed, but
only saved and replanted seeds originally purchased from
Monsanto or one of its licensees. The court did object to the
liquidated damages element of the license. Thus, demonstrating
that such licenses are more like contracts whose terms can be
reviewed on their merits. Instead of a very punitive measure of
damages, the court ordered that there be a focused inquiry into

41

The seed cleaner can perform a role very similar to the new seed producer in
collecting the license fee. Indeed, in the UK, this is currently done. Moreover, whether
or not the farmer is subject to a no-replant or a pay the fee to replant policy, the patent
holder will have a substantial policing cost especially if the license fee is substantial.
There is no good reason to believe that the no-replant policy involves appreciably
different policing costs than would a “fee for replant” policy.
42
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Monsanto’s actual damages. 43
Other cases involving this
restrictive license are pending in the Federal Circuit and in state
courts. 44
Once again one might ask what is the justification for this
restriction. Generally, as noted, a patent holder can make a
plausible argument that it is being deprived of its entitlement to
compensation for the use of its patented good. Having sold the
good, it can not plausibly argue that it does not intend to make
such sales in the future. From this perspective, it is using its right
to exclude to claim a right to be compensated for the quantity
saved and replanted arising from a lawful purchase of seed.
Nothing in the patent law as written specifically authorizes a patent
holder to impose a post-sale claim of this sort.45 Only by reading
such a right into the statute can the courts impose any obligation on
the farmer saving seed.
Assuming that the courts can imply such a right, it is important
to look at the specific restriction imposed. In the case of seeds, the
no-replant policy serves the interest of the patent licensees by
eliminating saved seed competition, and not the narrowly defined
interest of the patent holder. Moreover, the seed companies would
have a substantial incentive to standardize on the Monsanto genetic
system and not encourage the development of any of the other
systems available. Competition among patented technologies
would be likely to produce—and indeed in other genetic areas has
produced—a substantial reduction in prices. 46 Similarly, a noreplant policy would be among the additional restraints that would
be likely to be competed away.

43

Id. at 1344–52
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (currently on
appeal to the Federal Circuit) (similar facts as McFarling with respect to no-replant
claim; challenges to the validity of the patents themselves and claims of patent misuse
and antitrust violations); Complaint, Larsen v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., CA No.
LACV032776 (Dallas County, Dist. Ct., Iowa) (alleged conspiracy among seed
companies to use the license provision to eliminate competition).
45
It would appear that a more creditable case might be made that sale of saved seed
constitutes infringement of the patent since the seller is now directly profiting from the
sale of a good containing the patented element.
46
DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE HARVEST 199 (2001).
44
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Today, the only commercially viable type of herbicide resistant
genetic system is Monsanto’s. Moreover, it is now present in over
80% of the soybeans used as seeds. This means that Monsanto
through the expanded licensing rights recognized in McFarling can
also control any additional genetic changes in those seed stocks
through its conditional licenses. 47 Indeed, the rationale of the
McFarling decision would permit Monsanto to impose limits on
the marketing of soybeans themselves. For example, it could
require that farmers sell only to a buyer that Monsanto had
licensed. This would allow Monsanto to tax the sale value of the
crop as well. 48 Already, Monsanto is appropriating most of the
wealth created by its genetic innovation and under McFarling
might seek to appropriate the wealth of the farmers as well. 49
III. POST-SALE RESTRICTIVE LICENSING-AN INHERENT RIGHT?
The initial position of the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt was
that patent holders should have rights comparable to those of any
other producer of a product. 50 This included the right to sell the
product subject to contractual limits on the buyer’s freedom. Such
limitations would therefore be reviewable under both contract and
antitrust law for their legality and reasonableness. However, a
gradual transformation has occurred in which a right comparable to
that recognized generally in vertical distribution law has moved
toward an inherent and unreviewable right of the patent holder.
This transformation rests on a failure to distinguish between the
general interest of a producer in restraints that further its legitimate
business interests and a specific claim that the restraint is essential
to protecting an economic interest of the patent holder in exploiting
47
Whether and how much Monsanto has actually limited the development or addition
of other characteristics to seed stock with its genetic material is not established on the
public record so far as I know.
48
Cf., Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223
(1968).
49
See José B. Falck-Zepeda et al., Surplus Distribution from the Introduction of a
Biotechnology Innovation, 82 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 360 (2000); José B. Falck-Zepeda et
al., Rent Creation and Distribution from Biotechnology Innovations: The Case of Bt
Cotton and Herbicide-Tolerant Soybeans in 1997, 16 AGRIBUSINESS 21 (2000).
50
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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its rights. The four cases profiled in Part II illustrate the range of
issues and are suggestive of the need to make a careful distinction
between the two bases for restraint as well as developing criteria
for judging the merits of any restraint that rests on exploitation.
The Baumgardner decision is a good application of
Mallinckrodt in that it focused on the restraint as a contractual
agreement that might or might not be lawful. 51 The issue is
whether the law of contract of the state in which that contract was
made permits the kind of forum selection clause that was
employed. As in Mallinckrodt the key question turns on the issue
of contractual validity. Such agreements may reduce and facilitate
the enforcement of patent rights, but that is not a unique function
to such agreements. Rather, they are used generally in business
transactions and the law speaks generally to their validity or
invalidity. Upholding or rejecting the validity of that clause has no
direct effect on the validity of the patent or the rights of the patent
holder in respect to the patent. As such, the restraint is not a
functional incident of the patent but rather an incident of the sale of
goods having patented components.
The Ottawa case offers the first kind of distinction. 52 Here, as
suggested earlier, the restraints on resale serve no legitimate
interest in efficient marketing of the seed itself nor do they protect
any interest in the patented goods themselves. Indeed, to the
extent that resale moves seed from areas of surplus to areas of
need, the results are both efficient and serve the economic interest
of the patent holder. Blocking such transactions makes sense only
because it facilitates price discrimination among buyers in which
the goal is to exploit low volume buyers by charging them a higher
price than a standard commodity market would support. Such
exploitation can be justified as a patent right if, as Professor Chen
has argued, the constitutional goal is to maximize the revenue for
patent holders.
But the law has been clear that in fact
maximization is subject to a variety of constraints concerning the
method of exploitation. Indeed, the goal of further innovation
51

Monsanto Co. v. Baumgardner, No. 04-708 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2005) (unreported
opinion, on file with the author).
52
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N. D.
Iowa 2003).
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should focus on the least cost to society necessary to obtain the
desired level of innovation. Moreover, there is an implicit and
questionable assumption that precise levels of revenue have a
direction causal correlation with innovative efforts.
The central policy question becomes whether there is any
general justification for the kind of price discrimination observed
in Ottawa that should authorize patent holders to engage in such
exploitive conduct when it would be unlawful for other businesses
to engage in the same conduct. In assessing that issue, one concern
should be that the patent holder is discriminating against one set of
buyers and in favor of another. That is, it is tipping the economic
balance in downstream markets such that the low volume buyer is
“subsidizing” the high volume buyer beyond the level that an
efficient market in seed would permit. Further, the producer has in
fact stood willing to sell its product at the lower price to the
volume buyer which in itself suggests that the patent holder was
satisfied with that price. Indeed, arbitrage will result in an
increased volume of sales for the patent holder thus restoring to it
some part of the lost profits from its lower volume, but higher
priced sales. Lastly, as the opportunity to exploit existing rights
expands the incentive to allocate resources to developing more
sophisticated exploitation systems rather than to increased
innovation is a real possibility.
The foregoing considerations argue strongly against allowing a
patent holder to engage in price discrimination through the use of
post-sale restraints on the freedom of a buyer to resell the product.
This would not, as noted several times, eliminate all price
differences where there are cost factors that allow differential
prices within or among market areas or types of buyers. What is
being suggested is that only those price differences that arise from
the markets for the goods can be exploited to the benefit of the
patent holder. There is no good policy reason to impose on some
sub-set of buyers a special obligation to reward the patent holder. 53

53

It merits renewed emphasis that the analysis is different if the licensee is developing
a market or sub-market for the patent holder and there are risks of arbitrage or “freeriding” that would undercut such a joint enterprise. In those situations, territorial or
customer restraints facilitating price differences could be lawful, if reasonably necessary
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Seeds that reproduce themselves as in the McFarling case
present a more difficult challenge. 54 Here the patent holder can
more plausibly argue that the buyer gets the benefit of replicating
the patented trait in the absence of some restraint. On the other
hand, the buyer of such seed only gets the benefit of that inherent
characteristic. So the restraint on saving seed directly conflicts
with the basic technological facts. Certainly, if the farmer sells
such seed to another farmer, that would constitute a loss to the
patent holder of either a sale or royalty on a sale. Such sales would
constitute infringement. But when the farmer simply saves and
replants the seed, the question is what rights does a buyer acquire
when buying a commodity that is known to reproduce itself.
One answer is that it is for Congress and not the courts to
decide what rights the patent holder should have in such cases.
After all, the patent holder has chosen to sell the product rather
than insist on its right of exclusivity. In other contexts such as
performance of music 55 and the saving of seed protected by the
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA), 56 Congress has
chosen either to impose a compulsory license with a set royalty
(recordings of music) or to authorize the continued use of the
product by the buyer even though the buyer as duplicated the
product (the PVPA). On this basis, it should be clear that if
Congress were to address this issue, its resolution may well
involve some kind of sharing of rights. Absent specific instruction
from Congress, therefore, the courts cannot be sure what rights
should be granted and so should not presume to write such
legislation. 57
to protect legitimate interests of the joint enterprise, whether or not patents were involved
in any way.
54
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir 2004).
55
See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (authorizing recording on songs if anyone has already
recorded the song upon payment of a set royalty).
56
Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7 U.S.C.).
57
There is also a strategic reason for this approach. Seed companies would have strong
incentives to lobby Congress for a clarification of their rights. Such concentrated and
well organized interests are likely to have considerable influence on the legislative
process. At the same time, other stakeholders are more likely to have the capacity to
respond to such legislative initiatives in a way that is not feasible if they must seek
legislative reversal of a sweeping judicial grant of rights. In this latter case, the powerful,
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Although the foregoing might be the most logical way to
proceed, the courts and particularly the Federal Circuit appear
reluctant to see patent holders deprived to what the judges think
are their general entitlements. The McFarling case is a good
example of this sympathy and its basis in the perception that the
farmer has acted unfairly to deprive the patent holder of its
royalty. 58 Thus stated, the scope of the entitlement that provides
the basis for any restraint becomes clear. The patent holder has
already voluntarily parted with the patented good. Its only
remaining interest as a patent holder is to be compensated for the
use made of the good.
The issue becomes the scope of the contractual restraint that
might be imposed to protect that interest. As the analysis of the
Monsanto no replant policy has shown, all seed companies stand to
gain as result of the policy. This goes beyond the narrow interest
of Monsanto in seeking compensation for saved seed. Indeed, the
policy at least implicitly offers all seed companies the opportunity
to avoid technological competition if they standardize on
Monsanto’s herbicide resistant trait. Their interest in maintaining
the price of seed and increasing their sales volume as a direct result
of eliminating the saving of seed creates powerful incentives to
join the Monsanto program and avoid technological competition
because such competition is likely to lead to both price cutting and
the waving of onerous conditions such as the ban on saving seed.
This analysis suggests that the guiding principle in examining
such post-sale restraints on replication is whether they are
narrowly tailored to protect the interest of a patent holder as a
patent holder. If, however, the no replant policy is more restrictive
than necessary to achieve that goal, it would impose unnecessary
costs on the buyers and create avoidable risks to the overall
process of innovation because of its incentives. In the case of
saved seed, there is evidence that less restrictive alternatives exist
that could be used. In particular, farmers wanting to replant saved
seed can pay a royalty directly to Monsanto for that right based on
the amount of seed they save and replant. Indeed, as noted earlier,
concentrated interests need only work to frustrate legislative action which is an easier
task.
58
363 F.3d 1336.
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most farmers wanting to save seed will use a seed cleaning service
to clean and test the seed. Such a service can provide a more
centralized point to collect any fees. This is the practice in the
United Kingdom already. So it is not merely a hypothetical
response.
The more general conclusion is that if the courts are going to
fashion expansions of patent rights, they should do so guided by a
careful definition of the right that inheres in the patent holder and
then examine the means used to enforce that right to see whether it
is no more invasive than reasonably necessary to protect the right.
To go beyond that narrow authorization in the post-sale context is
to allow the patent holder to use the patent right to frustrate the
workings of the market to the detriment of buyers and to the
overall process of innovation.
CONCLUSION
The problem of post-sale restraints is one part of a much larger
set of issues concerning the appropriate scope and nature of the
patent system. There are more fundamental questions about the
kinds of “inventions” being patented as well as the uses being
made of patents in various contexts. The ultimate plea of this
Article is that it is time for those who oversee the patent system
both in the courts and in Congress to recognize that the grant of
patent rights confers the opportunity to tax the economy. As such,
it is essential that any taxation be reasonably related to the goals of
public policy and not just private avarice. It is therefore fitting to
close with Judge Easterbrook’s comment on another statute that
granted rights to exploit the public:
When special interests claim that they have obtained favors
from Congress, a court should ask to see the bill of sale.
Special interest laws do not have “spirits,” and it is
inappropriate to extend them to achieve more of the
objective the lobbyists wanted. . . . What the industry
obtained, the courts enforce; what it did not obtain from the
legislature—even if similar to something within the
exception—a court should not bestow. . . . Recognition
that special interest legislation enshrines results rather than
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principles is why courts read exceptions to the antitrust
laws narrowly, with beady eyes and green eyeshades. 59

59
Chicago Prof’l Sports L.P. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir.
1992).

